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The Twilight of Liberal Democracy: Symptomatic 
Reading of the Depoliticization  
 
Michael Hauser 
 
Summary: 
 
This article concerns the depoliticization of liberal democracy in 
general as well as from the perspective of Central Europe. It attempts 
to prove that the political theory of Rawls-Habermas does not 
adequately characterize this depoliticization and that, in contrast, it is 
possible to use Althusser’s symptomatic reading to understand it. I 
claim that a symptomatic reading was applied to political theory by 
Badiou and Rancière, but that there remains a hidden problem: how 
to put this reading into practice today, in the absence of a “Truth-
Event.” I propose to address this problem though  Žižek’s theory of 
the subject. 
A symptomatic reading of liberal democracies (perceiving their 
critical junctures) is hindered by the production of a consensus, 
which creates the widespread appearance of its “naturalness.” I 
attempt therefore to link Adorno’s description of cultural industry 
and Žižek’s concept of fantasy. In particular, I consider one of the 
main elements of consensus to be the fantasy of consensus. Due to the 
production of consensus, emancipatory politics cannot directly rely 
upon the agreement (disagreement) of the majority — the majority 
ultimately might agree with an authoritarian regime (I cite, for 
example, Putin’s Russia). It is here that the tautologies of liberalism 
appear. 
It is possible to construe the war on terrorism as part of the 
production of a new consensus. Its surrogate or supplement in the 
countries of Central Europe is “belated anticommunism.” It is 
possible at the same time to understand this war as an  attempt to 
restore the dwindling legitimacy of postcommunist liberal capitalism. 
The real question, however, is whether liberal democracy itself 
isn’t starting to appear as something “unnatural.”  
 
Michael Hauser 
Democracy without demos 
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At the beginning of the 1990s, in the euphoric times after the 
fall of “communism,” Jacques Derrida argued  in  Specters of Marx, 
specifically in the course of his polemic with Fukuyama, that after the 
triumph of liberal capitalism it is necessary more than ever to 
cultivate the “spirit of Marxist criticism,” reminding the glorifiers of 
this triumph that the victory of liberal capitalism and its alliance with 
liberal democracy is critical, fragile, threatened. (Derrida 1994: 68) 
The triumph of liberal democracy at that time seemed like 
Fukuyama’s end of History, like the “good news” of the  freest,   most 
rational and most natural order of human affairs that it is possible to 
attain: as it it were   the end of the evolution of ideology and the 
solution to the primary problems of human existence. Today it has 
become an intellectual fashion to distance oneself from this gospel, 
but isn’t it ultimately also the case, as Žižek says, that everyone agrees 
with Fukuyama, even though we don’t wish to admit it? Who today 
can imagine something other than liberal democratic capitalism? 
Hasn’t liberal democratic capitalism become so self-evident and 
natural for us that not even its greatest critics take searching for an 
alternative too seriously? It is as if Marx’s specters and the spirits that 
Derrida tried to summon as a condition for the opening of the horizon 
have remained far away from us on another planet. 
Twenty years after its triumph, it has become obvious that the 
gap between the ideal of liberal democracy, the “principle of popular 
sovereignty and the guarantee of basic rights under a rule of law,” 
which according to Fukuyama it is not possible to improve upon, and 
the sociopolitical reality has not disappeared and in several respects 
has widened. Fukuyama recognizes this gap already in his 
introduction to The End of History, where he writes that 
“contemporary democracies face any number of serious problems, 
from drugs, homelessness and crime to environmental damage and 
the frivolity of consumerism.” These problems, however, according to 
Fukuyama, “are not obviously insoluble on the basis of liberal 
principles, nor so serious that they would necessarily lead to the 
collapse of society as a whole.” (Fukuyama 2002: By Way of an 
Introduction) 
 The main issue regarding the fate of liberal democracy is, 
however, precisely this gap between its ideals and its phenomena, 
which indicate movement in the opposite direction: ranging from 
restrictions on the sovereignty of the people and the rule of law, 
beginning with the often described symbiosis of a representational 
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government and economic special interest groups (for example, see 
Broder: 2000), through the nondemocratic character of institutions 
like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, to the 
ACTA agreement, which in the name of intellectual property limits 
free dissemination of information on the internet.  
Generally, within liberal democracy there is a dwindling of the 
space that is political, the space of political struggle, in which 
decisions are made that affect society as a whole. If, like Chantal 
Mouffe, we differentiate between a liberal and an agonal democracy, 
then what we see is the disappearance of the agonal element of liberal 
democracy. Jacques Rancière would say that in liberal democracy the 
spaces “of politics” have disappeared, where the “uncounted” part of 
society can alone appear, those without a place in society (the “part 
without part”), who stand for universality, the embodiment of the 
entire society in the manner of the ancient Greek demos. This 
depoliticization then means a transformation of politics into 
postpolitics, whose task is “an opportune adaptability in terms of the 
demands of the world marketplace and the equitable distribution of 
the profits and costs of this adaptability.” (Rancière 1999: viii) 
Postpolitics is connected with postdemocracy, the situation when the 
idea of “the people” becomes a myth and society is only “a contract of 
free individuals” ensured by liberal democratic institutions. The 
paradox, which Rancière highlights, is that after the triumph of 
liberal democracy and the disappearance of the struggle for these 
institutions, which was led by the people, there has been a weakening 
of liberal democratic institutions, a weakening of “formal democracy.” 
(Rancière 1999: 97)  
The rapid appearance and disappearance of today's resistance 
movements, such as “Occupy Wall Street” or the “Indignados”, 
suggests that agonal space is displaced from liberal democracy: it 
arises as something heterogeneous and therefore only ephemeral. It is 
ephemeral agonal space. 
In the Czech Republic and in other postcommunist countries, 
the perspective was the converse until recently. The concept of “the 
people” aroused suspicion because it was tied to “actually -existing 
socialism,” in which it had been used to legitimize the apolitical 
“police order,” the indisputable and “natural” power of the Party as 
the representative of the people. The basic constitutional principle 
had been: “all power in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic belongs 
to the working people.” Because the historical memory and the 
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structure of political perception here were determined by experience 
with “people’s democracy,” liberal democratic institutions appeared 
as an indisputable barrier against the self-will of the “people,” who 
might threaten the rights and freedoms of the individual. In the 
postcommunist space, it was therefore the first task of radical 
democratic critics as well as politics to rip the signifier of “the people” 
from the fabric of real-existing socialist ideology, thus carrying out an 
act whose opposite is “the suturing” about which the radical 
democratic theoreticians Laclau and Mouffe write. One of the features 
of postcommunism is that the disappearance of “the people” brings a 
feeling of relief and liberation among the general population. 
Liberal democracy begins to depoliticize at the moment of the 
erosion and disappearance of the “demos,” which had disrupted the 
apolitical administration of the existing order by struggling for its 
rights. Thus the space of political struggle where debate about the 
whole shape and direction of society took place, not just items in the 
budget withers away in liberal democracy. It is ever clearer that its 
erasure was caused by a combination of three factors: the breakdown 
of traditional social movements (radical unions, workers’ movements 
and so on) in connection with the debacle of “actually-existing 
socialism”; the doctrine of neoliberalism, which is, according to 
Soros, the successor to totalitarian ideology (“the market” represents 
the indisputable, ultimate truth of politics); and finally the new form 
of capitalism, in which traditional collective identities dissolve (not 
only the people but also the nation or even society) and in place of 
them appears the “flexible” individual. To maintain a liberal 
democracy, it is held to be strictly essential that there exist a space for 
political struggle, because without this outlet it might lose its 
legitimacy in moments of crisis, periods of social unrest, mass 
dissatisfaction or far-right populism. Whoever wishes to see the 
preservation of liberal democracy should fight to maintain a space for 
political struggle and protect it from forces that would eliminate it. 
Depoliticization concerns that which is traditionally designated 
as the empirical content of democracy, which differs from the form of 
democracy as a framework in which this content moves. The question 
is whether the liberal form is separable from its empirical content and 
independent from it, or if the form conforms to its content and a de-
formation can occur, and consequentially the breakdown and 
disappearance of the form. 
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A Phenomenal reading of  depoliticization 
 
From the perspective of liberal political theory it seems as 
though there are normative ideals here, as formulated by Rawls or 
Habermas, and a set of “normal” societal phenomena — economic, 
social, political — which more or less operate along the lines 
circumscribed by normativity. Alongside it, there then appears 
something disruptive and dark, which is interpreted as an irrational 
manifestation of resistance against normative ideals. Depoliticization 
from this angle appears as an increase of spheres in which the dark 
matter of “abnormal” phenomena operates. They are on the rise 
because normative ideals are not sufficiently implemented, or their 
implementation is accompanied by a set of circumstances and 
unforeseen events that elicit waves of irrationality in individuals, 
social groups or ethnic communities. This dark matter in the body of 
a liberal democratic society, however, can not alone refute the Rawls-
Habermas theory. 
If the dark matter appears, for instance the growth of racism in 
some black and white communities where so-called busing took place 
(transporting black children to white schools in the United States, 
with the goal of eliminating mutual racial prejudices), which fulfilled 
the conditions of Rawls’ distributive justice (it would stand up against 
the requirement of a “veil of ignorance,” Žižek 1993: 215), the 
Rawlsian theoretician, if asked why the result of the application of his 
theory is the reverse of the intended goal, most would reply 
something to the effect that disruptive circumstances weren’t 
adequately eliminated (the communities were influenced by those 
who refused to take part in the experiment or by other communities). 
Every dominant theory has a tendency to downplay disruptive 
phenomena or to overlook them. Its essential frame of mind is 
optimism of the intellect (the opposite of what Gramsci termed 
pessimism of the intellect), thanks to which it so easily gains 
adherents and tars opponents as pessimists. Political theories that 
start to become dominant, however, never express merely a desire for 
recognition and optimism of the intellect, for they also have a 
legitimizing function: They justify the existing political structure or its 
components, in the case of the Rawls-Habermas theory the structure 
of liberal democracy. (Rancière concludes from this linking of 
political theory and the dominant order that “there is no such thing as 
political philosophy.” By that he means the unceasing effort of 
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political philosophy to rid itself of the scandal of “politics,” the 
impossibility of incorporating its disagreement paradigm of thought 
and perception into the existing “police” order. Rancière 1999: xii) 
There is a hidden tautology here, which is the basis of every ideology: 
Phenomena are a priori interpreted within it so that they can’t call it 
into question or undermine it. The dominant political theory is 
justified in and of itself: It is valid because it is valid. As Adorno says, 
it is valid because it is the expression of the given and it appears 
natural. Depoliticization within it necessarily looks like a 
phenomenon indicative of its own lack of fulfillment. It doesn’t call it 
into question, but on the contrary urges a more invigorated effort to 
fulfill it. 
 
Symptomatic reading and its transposition to the symbolic 
order   
 
Depoliticization can, however, also be connected with 
Althusser’s symptomatic reading. Althusser discovered this approach 
while reading Marx’s Capital, and he credited its discovery to Marx. 
In his reading he perceived that in a classical political economy, 
which Marx was stemming from while writing Capital, it is always a 
matter of what the economy sees and what it doesn’t see, or more 
precisely put, the economy sees it, but it isn’t visible for it. As 
Althusser says, “non-vision is therefore inside vision, it is a form of 
vision and hence has a necessary relationship with vision.” (Althusser 
1970: 21) It is for this reason that every system of thought has its own 
“problematic,” a given field of problems that determines what 
questions it can ask itself. If a new problem appears within the 
system, it isn’t visible, because it is connected to old questions. It’s 
true that the new problem is produced by this system, but the system 
is “necessarily blind to what it produces.” (Althusser 1970: 24) The 
production of a new problem is the signal of the beginning of change 
in its terrain and horizon, and the coming of a new problematic. A 
system of thought as well as science can present problems only on the 
level of a certain theoretical structure and its problematics, “which 
constitutes its absolute and definite condition of possibility, and 
hence the absolute determination of the forms in which an problems 
must be posed” (Althusser 1970: 25) The field of the problematic 
structures what is visible and what is necessarily excluded as 
invisible. In order to be able to behold the invisible and discover the 
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gaps in the fabric of the text, we need a new text, produced by the 
reflections of “the change of terrain.” The subject must occupy its new 
place in this new terrain. (Althusser 1970: 27) 
Althusser distinguishes between two types of reading, which 
presuppose the existence of two texts. In the first reading, the second 
text (Marx’s) is superimposed upon the first text (Smith’s, for 
example) so that the similarities and differences become apparent. 
This is a “retrospective theoretical reading,” during which, on the 
basis of the second text, we see the errors, oversights and gaps of the 
first text (Althusser 1970: 18) Only then is the second reading 
symptomatic. In this second reading, the errors, oversights and gaps 
of the first text are interpreted as symptoms of a new problematic and 
a change in the terrain of the first text, which is unconsciously present 
in it. The first text is put in relation to the second text so that the 
second text was “present as a necessary absence” (Althusser 1970: 28) 
in the first text. The second text is read in relation to the gaps and 
errors of the first text as to symptoms of its unconscious presence. In 
this way, the “unconscious thoughts” contained in the first text, which 
on the visible level of the first text were present in the form of their 
absence, start to be visible. (Althusser 1970: 32) This reading is aimed 
at what is invisible in the first text, its latent content. 
 Can this concept be applied to anything other  than theoretical 
or literary texts? Maybe it's similar to Lacan´s psychoanalysis. 
Initially Lacan was focused on language and speech, and it enabled 
him to form concepts such as the symbolic order or the big Other. But 
then he expanded its scope and transposed them to other social and 
cultural instances. Perhaps  symptomatic reading can be similarly 
conceived. Althusser discovered symptomatic  reading and the notion 
of latent content, but he did not have a conception that would allow 
him to transpose them out of the textual field. What he lacked was 
precisely the Lacanian conception of the symbolic order. This 
conception was based on , but not limited to,  the structures of  
language and speech The symbolic order is similar to the Althusser´s 
textual field:both are based on linguistic structures, and this 
similarity allows us to link the symptomatic reading and the concept 
of the latent content  to the symbolic order. 
The latent content as part of the symbolic order recalls of the 
Lacanian Real: it is what acts as gaps or void places. But there is a 
crucial difference. As Žižek writes about gaps or void places in the 
symbolic order, he connects them with the Real, itself characterized 
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by being ever present and irremovable. In advance, the concept of the 
Real ensures that the Symbolic is always incomplete and incoherent. 
Although many concrete examples of the Real are given to us, they are 
revealed only inthe  relationship between the Real and the Symbolic. 
The question here is how these gaps change the symbolic order, and 
what is their content. If we say that it is a void, then these gaps have 
only one function: to disrupt the coherence of the symbolic order. 
That their content may become the cornerstone of a new symbolic 
order is determined not by these gaps but by  the latent content. 
If the Symbolic is too quickly connected with the Real, it is quite 
difficult to explain how and why changes in the Symbolic occur only 
in terms of the Real. What is lacking here is how to capture the 
dynamics of the Real, how to historicize it. The Real has no content 
that would somehow change:, it has no history. And here is the place 
for Althusser´s latent content. This could be understood as  the 
content of the Real, as a gap in the Symbolic containing the invisible 
content. For example, the political order has a a  symbolic order. 
It produces what is visible in it and what forms the content of 
knowledge (facts, statistics, opinions, theories), which is derived from 
it. But this symbolic order also produces what is invisible for it, what 
it necessarily excludes because of its limits. Because these boundaries 
are internal, not external, the knowledge associated with a given 
symbolic order can continually expand without diminishing the 
invisible field. This produces a latent content within the symbolic 
order, which induces the invisible transformation of its terrain and 
horizon (a décalage). These contents show themselves as symptoms 
of gaps in the knowledge. They can be identified by reading the "first 
text", thus focusing on the immediate content of the knowledge 
connected to a given symbolic order. 
In the symbolic order, a second level appears as referred to its 
potentiality. The symbolic order is divided into the explicit content 
and the latent contentproduced by its practice and containing a "new 
problematic". This is invisible for it, even though, so to speak, it is in 
its sight. The symbolic order produces a latent content, analogous to 
the Real, but unlike the Real it comprises what may be a new horizon 
of the symbolic order. The concept of the latent content thus 
completes Žižek´s theory, but this complement changes its tone. If 
Žižek understands his thinking as dialectical materialism, 
characterizedby the  irremovability of the Real, by  introducing  latent 
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content, we arrive at historical materialism as a theory of changes in 
the symbolic order. 
 
The Problem of the “two texts”: Badiou, Rancière, and Žižek 
 
Symptomatic reading has already been applied  by Badiou and 
Rancière beyond the realm of the text even though the concept can 
only be located with difficulty in their work, and it appears as if there 
were a complete rupture between them and Althusser. But we can 
identify in both the distinction of two levels, the second of which is 
attached to the first  as the  appearance of  what has been invisible. 
In place of the first text, Badiou and Rancière insert the existing 
sociopolitical configuration: for Badiou it is the “State of the 
Historical-Social Situation,” (Badiou 2005: 104nn); for Rancière it is 
the “police” order, the existing system of the distribution of social 
positions and roles, and its legitimization. (Rancière 1999: 28) The 
second text is for Badiou the "Truth-Event", which is attached to the 
“State of the Historical-social Situation,” and only then “evental sites” 
are to be revealed. For Ranciere it is “political subjectification, which 
is attached to the “police order,” rendering  the “part without part” 
visible.  
If we look at the sociopolitical situation (the State of the 
Situation; the police order) from its own perspective, it seems 
coherent and self-evident — analogous to the first text read in relation 
to its own “problematics.” In this method of reading, all errors, 
oversights and gaps necessarily have the form of secondary, 
peripheral phenomena, which are unrelated to the structure of the 
existing situation itself. They are visible only to the degree to which it 
is possible to interpret them as negative side-effects or a temporary 
deviation from the existing order of things. Their perception and 
interpretation is circumscribed by the structure and scope of the 
existing situation, replicated in the dominant theories. An example 
might be the perception of the financial crisis by Czech neoliberals. If 
they accept that a crisis exists, then they see it as a “flu virus” (Czech 
ex-President Václav Klaus), which will pass away by itself. A real 
crisis, which could cause destruction of the market economy, is ruled 
out a priori. If we ask why, the response is a tautology: Because an 
unregulated market economy creates a state of equilibrium (between 
supply and demand) in principle it cannot collapse. A market 
economy cannot fail, because a market economy cannot fail. 
9
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But doesn’t something similar happen in the liberal democratic 
paradigm as well? From its perspective, aren’t all unsettling 
phenomena, like the failure of multiculturalism, outbreaks of violence 
in the suburbs of European metropoli, the spreading of racism and 
xenophobia, the rise of the far right, finally nothing more than a “flu 
virus” for liberal democracy, which will pass with time or will be 
cured by a still greater empowerment of the existing sociopolitical 
practices? Racism, xenophobia or religious fundamentalism don’t 
signal the failure of liberal multiculturalism, but rather that there 
wasn’t enough multiculturalism. In the same way, in this paradigm 
the gradual constraint or circumvention of liberal democratic 
institutions (especially those that contain elements of Rawls-
Habermas’ procedural democracy — in the Czech Republic, the 
reluctance of the government to hold a referendum about the 
placement of an American antimissile base here) cannot appear 
except as analogous to a flu virus, or, perhaps to more critical minds, 
pneumonia, but in any case an illness which it is possible to treat with 
known remedies. 
Badiou and Rancière show under what conditions these 
“peripheral” phenomena start to act as symptoms of errors, 
oversights and gaps of the existing situation or order, as symptoms of 
“unspoken thoughts.” A peripheral phenomenon thus changes into a 
symptom when a Truth-Event appears, as for Badiou (the example is 
the French Revolution, after which arose the fidelity to this Truth-
Event, and this fidelity rendered visible what was in invisible in the 
“old regime,” its injustice, wantonness, tyranny), or political 
subjectification, in which the universalization of the “part without 
part” occurs: The part without a place in society begins to represent 
the Whole, like the demonstrators against the “communist” 
dictatorship in the waning days of the German Democratic Republic 
(East Germany) chanting “wir sind das Volk,” “We are the people.” A 
phenomenon becomes a symptom only retroactively, after the act has 
taken place and perspective is established, which it isn’t possible to 
conclude from the parameters of the existing order. 
The retroactive transformation of a phenomenon into a 
symptom shouldn’t mean, however, that there is a radical gap 
between the interpretation of a given phenomenon before and after 
the act. If the symptomatic phenomenon appeared from all positions 
in the existing order as only a temporary failure, then the entire 
interpretation would be regulated by historical (over)determination 
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within the existing order, i.e. before introducing the “second text” 
(the Truth-Event;  political subjectification), no phenomenon could 
be explained as a symptom. This means that prior to an Event it 
would not be possible to construe any phenomenon as a symptom. 
Badiou reckons with this problem by introducing the concept of the 
“evental site,” which is found at the edge of the void or gap of the 
existing situation. Evental sites are those in which “radically 
transformative events” could begin. (Badiou 2005: 176) 
I believe nonetheless that this too remains a weak point of 
Badiou’s (and by analogy also Rancière’s) theory, since the question 
of how exactly the agent of a transformative event interpret the 
“evental site” as evental when there has not yet been a Truth-Event or 
“evental situation” remains unanswered. The question of a pre-
evental interpretation is, however, crucial for our times, in which a 
Truth-Event is absent and there appear only its ephemeral signs in 
the form of "color" revolutions or resistance movements such as 
“Ocupy Wall Street” or “Indignados.” There are then nothing more 
than memories of past Truth-Events, which cannot function again if 
for no other reason than that they mostly ended in disaster (désastre). 
The October Revolution, fulfilling the criteria of a Truth-Event, ended 
in the disaster of Stalinism; Prague Spring, which can at least 
partially be regarded as a Truth-Event,1 ended in the disaster of 
Husák’s Normalization. Badiou’s weak point can be specified thus: If 
a Truth-Event is absent, and there is only an unevental situation in 
which there are at most hypothetical evental sites,2 how do we make 
the shift that enables us to occupy the position of the “second text” 
which would allow the interpretation of phenomena as symptoms and 
the revealing of evental sites? The answer to this dilemma does not 
come from Badiou’s concept of the subject as a point set apart from 
                                               
1
 The Prague Spring triggered an exceptional politicization of society and revealed an unexpected social 
dimension, which was not possible to “calculate” from the previous situation of the Novotný regime, in 
which political apathy was “normal.” At the same time, it wasn’t fully a Truth-Event, for its agents merely 
reformed the previous regime and did not establish a gap. From a formal perspective, the Prague Spring 
was only a half Truth-Event. Nonetheless, it is true that its agents and a significant part of the politicized 
society invoked the Truth-Event of the October Revolution, as slogans appeared like “Lenin wake up, 
Brezhnev’s gone mad.” From this perspective the Prague Spring appears as a Truth-Event rejuvenating the 
paradigmatic Truth-Event in that it invokes, even though it is in a completely different historical situation.  
2
 Slavoj Žižek states that one of these places today could be the ever-expanding slums around large cities in 
the Third World. Their residents are beyond the reach of the state and live without any kind of social, 
health or old-age security, and at the same time they are in many ways connected with the global economy. 
Circumstances force them into a situation of minimal self-organization. Even though there are major 
differences between them and Marx’s “working class” (defined by precisely circumscribed economic 
exploitation), if there is any candidate today for a new proletariat, it is exactly them. (Žižek 2008: 424) 
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the existing order, which Badiou connects with fidelity to a Truth-
Event. 
The answer may come from a different theory, however, one in 
which the subject is always-already “dislocated” and is never 
completely identical with the existing order: the Lacan-Žižek theory 
of the subject as $ (sujet barré, or barred subject; for its most detailed 
explanation, see Johnston 2008). This subject is in and of itself the 
evental site, because with regard to the symbolic order it represents a 
void, albeit a void filled with a fantasy originating in relation to this 
order. But it isn’t just a fantasy. The subject, precisely to the extent 
that it is a void, does not become the result of functions of a power 
discourse. Then it is possible to ponder whether, even though a 
Truth-Event or political subjectification is absent and we are still 
inherently in a postpolitical situation, we can begin here and now to 
read phenomena such as depoliticization as symptoms that reveal the 
voids and fissures in the existing liberal democratic order and draw 
attention to those voids and fissures as a new “problematic,” as a new 
political terrain and horizon, which is “present in its absence” in the 
liberal order. 
Žižek’s concept of the subject here is crucial: It makes it possible 
to see the “dislocation” of the subject accompanied by the 
fundamental incoherence of the big Other. Even though a Truth-
Event is absent, all problematic phenomena change into symptoms of 
the incoherence of the order. The gaps in the “first text” become 
visible, even though there is no “second text” here, because every text 
is constituted of its voids.3 Every problematic phenomenon is the 
symptom of the Real of the dominant order — its irremovable gaps 
and voids, which the dominant order must conceal in order to govern. 
                                               
3
 However, symptomatic reading without the "second text" can be found in Pierre Macherey’s A Theory of 
Literary Production. Macherey argues that the literary work includes the absence of speech, what must not 
be said so as something can be expressed (Macherey 1978: 83). Macherey calls this the unconscious of the 
work which, however, is not a second, deeper level, but what occurs in the production of the work. (92) 
The unconscious of the work is here understood as a series of determinations, ruptures and gaps given by a 
relationship to the outside,  e.g. to the ideological project of the "conquest of nature" in the novels of Jules 
Verne, and what must be foreclosed so  the work could say what it wants to say (Macherey 1978: 94). At 
the level of representation, however, the work is relatively homogenous and consistent (Macherey 1978: 
194). 
     In the Macherey´s symptomatic reading, instead of the “second text, ” an  activity appears. It is the 
questioning of the complexity of relationships to the outside present in the work itself. The question is 
thereby being produced by the answers that the work gives, without knowing the question. Literary 
criticism thus produces the object of the work, which it is not given immediately. It is the process of 
producing  the object that allows to read the symptoms of what the work wants to say but cannot. Macherey 
combines two of Althusser´s concepts: symptomatic reading and knowledge as a theoretical practice. 
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One of the main ways in which the dominant order veils its 
incoherence is the production of consensus. 
 
Against consensus 
 
Žižek breaks through one vexing vicious circle of “critical 
theory” (first generation) and (neo)Marxism, including Althusser’s: 
Given that the subject is (over)determined by the historical situation, 
and its consciousness, unconsciousness, self-perception as well as 
behavior are shaped by the repressive and ideological mechanisms of 
late capitalism, where is the space for criticism of society, of 
capitalism, of repression, of depoliticization? (Althusser tried to 
reckon with this difficulty by implementing a radical critique of 
humanism, and he rejected the self-perception and immediate 
consciousness of the “human personality” as a form of ideology, thus 
he took a step similar to that of Foucault, who viewed humanism as 
part of the discourse of power.) If this space disappears (by 
integrating wage laborers, labor unions, or groups or movements that 
expressed opposition to the system, such as the Western student 
movement of 1968), it is easy to brand social critics as pro-
totalitarian, antidemocratic and elitist “dinosaurs.” After the 
disappearance of such oppositional agents, it is possible to dismiss 
every criticism of society, as well as criticism of depoliticization, as 
the expression of hysterical and irresponsible individuals. The 
authorities of the existing order (the power elite, media, teams of 
experts sponsored by large corporations)4 can then without any great 
difficulties produce consensus. 
The production of consensus has two layers, the first one 
material and the second one fantasy. The material layer is composed 
of the system and nature of information, interpretations, images, 
“personalities” who are connected with what is traditionally called the 
cultural industry or consciousness industry.5 The fantasy layer is 
                                               
4
 It is necessary to differentiate the ruling class and the power elite, which according to the classic 
definition of Pareto and Mosca is made up of those who take part in the formation and acceptance of 
government decisions, those who influence the decision-making agents, or who themselves participate in 
the decision-making process. The elite, it’s true, is limited by class domain (certain questions which are 
connected with the economic domain, such as the production process, are outside this discussion), but at the 
same time has a certain autonomy from it. 
5
 See Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, chapter “The Cultural Industry,” in which 
there is a detailed analysis of “the a priori schemata of perception and thought” that produces and is 
instilled in the cultural industry. (Adorno-Horkheimer, 1979) In Debord we read that the production of 
goods is connected with the production of spectacles, and that every type of good has its own spectacle. 
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harder to pin down, but it is no less important: it is the fantasies that 
are connected with the previous layer, but which can’t be assigned to 
it. The first layer on the one hand presents the texture of the big 
Other, and it has the function of Law (it instills models of thought and 
perception), but at the same time has its obscene supplement, the 
sphere of the superego, in which fantasies originate which aren’t the 
immediate contents of the products of the industry of consciousness. 
The production of consensus, which plays out on the first layer, is 
supported by the second layer, which can act as a negation of the 
contents of the first layer. An example of such a fantasy might be the 
right-wing fantasy of “the unemployed,” which originates in response 
to the question, “what does the Other want from me?” and is 
personified in images, information, “personalities” of the first layer. 
This fantasy presents “the unemployed” as an idler who lives off social 
support and exploits the taxpayers. It is similar with the consensus 
about “Czech national interests,” which the Civic Democratic Party (a 
neoliberal party with features of populism) tries to produce in the 
Czech Republic. Here too must be the fantasy of the European Union 
as the last bastion of socialism, wanting to deprive us of our national 
enjoyment (jouissance). 
The first layer has to do with the contents of consciousness, and 
the second, the fantasy layer, of unconscious desire. Existence of the 
second layer is possible under the proviso that the first layer isn’t 
entirely coherent, that there are gaps in it, which gives rise to the 
creation of a fantasy to fill them. The first layer at the same time 
represents what Althusser and Žižek call the material existence of 
ideology, which is connected with mundane practices like reading a 
tabloid newspaper.6 
The trap of “critical theory” is that it stems from this consensus 
as something given, or more precisely, identifies the content of the 
material layer with the content of desire because it lacks the concept 
of fantasy, which makes it possible to see the gap between the 
industry of consciousness and the psychosocial life of individuals and 
                                                                                                                                            
These spectacles are thus extremely inconsistent, but at the same time are integrated “in the universal 
system that contains them: […] capitalism.” (Debord 2006: par. 56) 
 
6
 See for example Žižek 1997: 6. Fantasy, which operates during the production of consensus, corresponds to the 
narrative form of fantasy, which obscures some traumatic event by categorizing its elements into a particular 
chronological sequence. The example is the sociopolitical myth of primitive accumulation, about two workers, one lazy 
and the other one industrious (and who became rich), which obscures the trauma of fundamental societal antagonism. 
Žižek 1997: 10n. Description of the mechanism whereby fantasy originates, see Žižek 1997: 32n. 
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communities. The fantasy layer never coincides with the layer of 
consciousness: It is never possible to precisely calculate it; it is its 
spectral supplement. 
Using Žižek’s concept of  fantasy, it is possible to achieve 
another slight shift of perspective: A part of the production of 
consensus is also the production of the fantasy of consensus. One of 
the primary ways to produce consensus is to create the illusion that 
the presented contents and attitudes are shared by the majority, and 
whoever doesn’t share them is in the minority or is even a solitary 
eccentric, a romantic dreamer or an extremist who is unwilling to 
accept the “reality” of the majority consensus. Whoever doesn’t accept 
the majority consensus, which it is possible to easily pass off as the 
will of the majority, is a potentially dangerous elitist or an 
authoritarian contemptuous of democracy. 
That doesn’t mean that the production of consensus isn’t 
efficacious. In the field of sociological research, especially that which 
poses questions in a biased way, the statements are often in 
accordance with consensus, but Žižek’s theory makes it possible to 
differentiate between public self-presentation in polls and sociological 
research and the fantasy framework in which this self-presentation 
plays out. The great merit of Althusser, Lacan and Žižek’s “theoretical 
antihumanism” is that it succeeds in eroding the “myth of the given” 
(Adorno), thus preserving one of the essential theoretical imperatives 
of “critical theory” of the first generation, which Habermas replaced 
with the imperative of communication, which comes from the 
manifest content of the statements of the participants. 
This “antihumanistic” embrace of consensus then can be 
connected with the issue of the dominant theory or discourse. Its 
dominance is always connected with the production of consensus, for 
the theory or discourse becomes dominant only when it succeeds in 
producing consensus, a part of which is the fantasy of consensus. The 
dominance of the theory or discourse rests upon this fantasy element. 
The dominant theory or discourse loses power over us, if we succeed 
in discovering and barring this fantasy element. Its barring leads to a 
situation in which our interpretation is not driven by consensus, by 
our fantasy of consensus, but rather by the voids in the dominant 
theory or discourse. 
If we are coming from a liberal democratic conception of 
consensus, depoliticization itself is ambiguous — the problem in some 
respect becomes the problem itself. If this consensus begins to drive 
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our interpretation of depoliticization, we are snared by the question-
trap: What happens when depoliticization meets with consensus? In 
the name of whom or what do we criticize depoliticization? Isn’t it 
possible that the majority wishes to live their private lives and they 
perceive depoliticization as freedom from politics? In this way 
criticism of depoliticization gets into the position of authoritarian 
enlighteners, who view the desires of the majority from on high and 
see in them manifestations of irrationality. It is possible to avoid 
these traps by letting our point of departure be not consensus, but 
rather a symptomatic reading, which in the “reality” of consensus sees 
its Real, its incoherence, gaps and contradictions. 
 
A symptomatic reading of depoliticization 
 
How is depoliticization usually defined? A definition that takes 
into account a distinction between the ruling classes and the power 
elite might look something like this: Depoliticization is the process by 
which increasingly only the power elite participates in the formation 
and acceptance of decisions that have a direct or indirect impact on 
society as a whole. During this process there is generally a restriction 
of civil rights and freedoms. As the space for decision-making is 
closed off from the majority of citizens, it is increasingly difficult for 
the majority to reverse this process with lawful means. 
This and similar definitions assume that the excluded majority 
disagrees with the process of depoliticization, which means that the 
production of consensus fails, and in place of consensus the general 
mood of the majority becomes one of disagreement. This concept of 
disagreement corresponds to the liberal understanding of consensus 
— disagreement can be, simply put, just as much a fantasy as 
consensus is. It comes from the notion that a breakdown or 
restriction of liberal democratic procedures automatically triggers the 
opposition of the majority, and thus it is an extension of the basic 
utopian construct of liberalism: that the majority agrees with the 
procedures and principles of liberal democracy because the people 
are free and rational beings. If the majority freely rejects liberal 
democracy, for example by voting for the Nazi Party or the 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (which won in free elections in 
1946), then liberalism sees the manipulated masses — the majority of 
voters are not acting as free and rational beings. A person is a free 
and rational being only when he accepts liberal democracy. 
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The scenario then becomes quite clear: The power elite, which 
limits the majority’s access to decision-making, isn’t capable of 
producing consensus and it loses legitimacy. Thus the gulf grows 
wider between the increasingly powerful handful and the increasingly 
powerless majority. During this process, the powerful handful veers 
more and more toward the use of violence against its opposition, and 
there is a spiraling loss of legitimacy: When it loses legitimacy, it can 
hold onto power only through violence, and if it uses violence, it loses 
even more of its legitimacy. This state is unsustainable in the long 
run, and two possibilities remain: either the overthrow of the handful 
by the majority, or the implementation of self-restraint and a partial 
redistribution of power. (The inclination toward partial self-restraint 
of power appeared toward the end of real-existing socialism with 
“perestroika.” From the perspective of the logic of power, it is possible 
to interpret perestroika and its accompanying political liberalization 
as self-restraint of power for the purpose of retaining it. For radical 
opponents of the regime, it must have been their worst nightmare 
that perestroika would be successful, for it would have meant a 
stabilization of the regime.) 
But things aren’t necessarily so simple. Žižek speaks of a much 
more effective means of creating agreement with the regime than the 
concept of legitimacy. Every regime presents a particular form of the 
organization of enjoyment (jouissance), corresponding to one of 
Lacan’s four discourses. For example, Nazism organized enjoyment 
by means of the obscene supplement, which was the persona of the 
Jew, who  stood in the way of its attainment: If there weren’t any 
Jews in Germany, problems would disappear and Germans would 
finally create a society of solidarity.7 There are also other ways to 
create agreement, such as the aestheticization of evil or the shared 
awareness of a crime as a common dark secret, which is evinced by 
the fact that Nazism could rely on the agreement of the majority. 
The problem of depoliticization itself is thus seen in a different 
light. With both of these undemocratic regimes of the 20th century 
there was a far greater politicization than there is today in liberal 
democratic countries. At first glance it is possible to say that Nazism 
as well as “communism” (in several periods) were regimes during 
which liberal democratic depoliticization (pursuing private interests, 
                                               
7
 The basic premise of Žižek’s concept of enjoyment (jouissance) as a factor that creates agreement with 
Nazism and Stalinism, see Dean 2006: 47–93. 
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consumerism) alternated with unprecedented repoliticization (a 
hard-to-ignore number of people who often voluntarily participated 
in building a “new world,” the growth of membership in unions and 
the party, public rallies, the politicization of thinking). After the 
regimes’ demise came depoliticization: people retreating into private 
life and indulging in a consumerist lifestyle. 
Politicization can be connected with the accession of an 
authoritarian dictatorship and depoliticization, by contrast, with the 
accession of liberal democracy. Neoconservative theoreticians and 
politicians therefore can proclaim that depoliticization is the hallmark 
of a free democratic society, whereas politicization breaks out 
wherever some enemy of democracy appears. Politicization and 
depoliticization therefore can’t be appraised independently of the 
sociopolitical framework in which they play out. Politicization can 
mean either the accession or the side-effect of an authoritarian 
dictatorship or the manifestation of opposition to it. 
But what’s happening today? How exactly do we describe the 
contemporary depoliticization, and what is the symptom? If we 
proceed from the aforementioned definition of depoliticization as the 
closure of political space, we should add to it the problem of 
consensus. The question then becomes whether the closure of 
political space isn’t accompanied by the production of consensus. In 
other words, if depoliticization can’t be consensual — if the 
production of consensus is not successful. That would mean that it 
isn’t possible to immediately rely on the disagreement of the majority 
to oppose depoliticization, because the majority might accept the 
produced consensus. We see this phenomenon today in Russia, where 
in free elections the majority supported Putin, even though he 
advocates a centralization of power and depoliticization in the sense 
of closure of the political space, which of course doesn’t preclude an 
“authoritarian” form of politicization. 
How to describe the current production of consensus in 
connection with politicizationdepoliticization? The production of 
consensus again has two layers: material and fantasy. On the one 
hand there are mobilizing slogans, such as the war on 
terrorismwhich, as Žižek demonstrates in his book about Iraq, are 
quite inconsistently substantiated: There are missing links in the 
chain of evidence or this chain is absent altogether. (Žižek 2004) On 
the fantasy layer arises the figure of Islam which threatens “Western 
civilization,” our way of life and our form of enjoyment (jouissance). 
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In the postcommunist countries of Central Europe, in which the 
slogan war on terrorism doesn’t resound very strongly due to 
geopolitical reasons, its supplements or surrogates appear, above all 
so-called belated anticommunism. Its fantasy is the persona of the 
communist, who plots and plans to grab power and undermine 
freedom and democracy. It would be possible to show that belated 
anticommunism relies on a similarly incoherent chain of arguments 
as the war on terrorism: It assumes that we are living at the beginning 
of the “Cold War,” not after its end, or that the communists could 
again carry out a “proletarian revolution,” even though no classical 
proletariat exists. Anticommunists who today fight against 
communism as the destroyer of liberal democracy refuse to see the 
real threat to liberal democracy, which comes from global capitalism, 
economic crisis or the war on terrorism. Another fantasy that 
underpins consensual depoliticization is that of  “troublesome” 
immigrants or ethnic minorities, who start to appear as the root of 
our problems and trigger a yearning for a “firm hand,” which replaces 
the dysfunctional “invisible hand of the market.” 
If the production of consensus is successful, then all of these 
themes stop being a question about where the political struggle is 
heading and become the myth of the given: It is senseless to doubt 
what is perceived as self-evident. What was not obvious, becomes 
obvious and “natural,” “second nature” (Lukács). (“Second nature” is 
the result of some type of production, which appears as something 
natural.) Precisely this naturalization is the primary result of the 
successful production of consensus. 
One of the main questions now emerging, however, is the 
converse: Isn’t liberal democracy and its “a priori” principles affected 
by the converse process? Doesn’t it happen that what was obvious 
becomes unobvious and unnatural? Why should citizens decide about 
important issues when ... (they aren’t experts, they have no 
responsibility, they think only about themselves, and so on)? The 
reasons here are unimportant, what’s decisive is whether a fantasy 
framework has begun to be created, without which these reasons will 
not have an effect. In other words, isn’t it the dawn of the 
denaturalization of liberal democracy? It isn’t so difficult to imagine 
that the fundamental principles of liberal democracy (“man is a free 
and rational being and has the right to decide about that which in 
some way affects him”) could be gradually forgotten and in their place 
would emerge other principles that adhere to the production of 
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consensus. Or  the obscene supplement of the officially recognized 
liberal discourse in that this would be interpreted in terms of it (“yes, 
man is a free and rational being, but only if he is native-born French, 
German, Czech ...”).  
It is possible then to read the denaturalization of liberal rights 
and freedoms as the symptom of the “absent”, latent content, which 
is, of necessity, suppressed so that this denaturalization can proceed. 
What is this suppressed content? It is a crisis of the liberal democratic 
framework in which this process takes place: the de-form(ation) of 
form by its content. If its effective publication occurred — if it became 
a topic for the mass media, teams of experts, politicians — it would 
mean that depoliticization had become the political issue, and that 
the very politicization of depoliticization would have occurred. 
Drawing public attention to it would rid this process of its self-
evidence and naturalness and it would render it an object of political 
struggle, which would begin to divide society into its supporters and 
opponents, for example into autocrats and democrats. Put differently,  
a naturally occurring depoliticization would stop and its politicization 
would begin. But it isn’t possible to count on this, because the mass 
media, experts and politicians, insomuch as they act as components 
of the existing order (Rancière’s “police” order), are forced to not-see 
its crisis, and the only exception are far-right politicians, who speak 
openly about the crisis of liberal democracy, but only in order to try to 
create a majority agreement with further political restrictions on the 
majority. All of this is continually playing out within the framework of 
liberal democracy, which inhibits the visibility of its crisis, because as 
the dominant order it must conceal its errors, oversights and gaps. If 
this process continues as “natural,” their exposure and publication 
will take place only when this framework will be replaced by another 
framework, within which their invisibility already will be beside the 
point, or  will be one of the sources of legitimacy.  
The example might be postcommunist liberal democracy, which 
draws a sizable part of its legitimacy from exposing and publicizing 
the “crimes of communism.” To paraphrase Masaryk’s famous 
assertion that “states are upheld by the ideals of which they were 
born,” then it is possible to say: Postcommunist states are upheld by 
the communism of which they were born, as its obscene supplement. 
If the experience with “communism” withers away, it is necessary to 
revive it again. Belated anticommunism is the attempt to restore the 
dwindling legitimacy of postcommunist liberal capitalism. A full 
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exposure and publication of concealed voids and crisis points always 
happens retroactively and, as we see in postcommunist countries, this 
exposure and publication can have the traits of an “eternal return of 
the same.” 
All this of course does not imply that the process of 
depoliticization acts as an irreversible historical determination. As 
Immanuel Wallerstein says, the current situation is the situation of 
the protracted transition to another socioeconomic configuration, to 
another “world-system.” It is not possible to assume how this would 
be from the components of the existing situation, because “not 
paradoxically, it will also be a period in which the ‘free will’ factor will 
be at its maximum, meaning that individual and collective action can 
have a greater impact on the future structuring of the world than such 
action can have in more ‘normal’ times, that is, during the ongoing 
life of a historical system.” (Wallerstein 1998: 35) Due to structural 
reasons, the result isn’t determined beforehand — it is a matter of 
political struggle. Nor is naturalization and depoliticization itself a 
process that takes place “behind our backs” with natural necessity, for 
there always must be political agents here who promote and produce 
naturalization and depoliticization. 
The most serious consequence of naturalization and 
depoliticization is the disappearance of the demarcation lines 
between the proponents of the emancipatory potential of liberalism 
(universality of rights and freedoms) and those who promote 
“liberalism” without the emancipatory core or who try to produce the 
consensus that universal emancipation is unnatural, unwanted or 
reserved for privileged groups or citizens. The main problem is that 
the production of consensus establishes demarcation lines that follow 
completely different criteria (an attitude toward a “clash of 
civilizations,” toward the “war on terrorism,” toward “political 
extremism,” toward “totalitarianism”). The main response to the 
current depoliticization should therefore be the drawing of clear lines 
of demarcation that divide the side of emancipation from the side of 
“order.” 
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